Kyiv has the motive, the means and the opportunity.
InfoWars: Black Boxes now in London, Kyiv commandeered Air Traffic control Tapes
In addition to releasing the Traffic Controller tapes Kyiv must also subject their BUK missile launches to a full independent International forensic audit to determine if any Missiles have been launched or gone missing.
I am afraid that this is a False Flag Operation that is designed to give the US "the right to invade Ukraine on the pretense of securing the crash site. Even though the Crash site is secure as both the OSCE and Malaysia Airlines have stated. Those attending to the crash site are professional police and emergency service staff. They same people that would attend a plane crash had it happened outside of a civil war conflict.
If you think that the notion of Ukraine forces shooting down the plane is beyond belief think again.
Kyiv Feb 21, Maidan Sniper/Provocateur killed over 100 people. Including Police and Protestors. Suspect Right Sector Ultra Nationalist
Odessa May 2. organized Pogrom and attack on pro-Russian protest site at the Union House People wearing red arm bands threw Molotov cocktails and fired shots into the building. It was later discovered that those indie had been murdered strangled and shot Including a pregnant women strangled with an electric power card and then set alight.
Mariupol May 8. Armed Right Sector Militia sanctions by Kyiv's interim Government stormed the local police station killing all inside for what is said to be a reprisal attack for the police not carrying out the order of the Kyiv junta
If they can do that then the idea of shooting down an international airliner to "burn bridges" between Russia and Ukraine in order to secure international support and provide support and pretense for US invasion is not beyond belief.
Wednesday, July 23, 2014
Kyiv has the motive, the means and the opportunity.
Sunday, June 29, 2014
Ukraine - The Birth of a Nation. A 4 part series as seen from a polish perspective.
This documentary failed to give recognition to the role played by Olexandr Moroz, leader of the Socialist party of Ukraine, without whom the Orange Revolution and the election of Victor Yushchenko would not have been successful.
In December 2004 Viktor Yushchenko was elected Ukraine's third President with 54% support o voters in the third round of voting in what was to be known as the Orange Revolution .
Part of the agreement arsing from the Orange Revolution was the Ukraine's transition from Presidential rule towards a parliamentary system of governance.
In 2002/3 Victor Yushchenko opposed the adoption of a Parliamentary Democacy a proposal put forward by Lenoid Kuchma that fell short by just five votes (295) of the two-thirds vote (300) of Ukraine's Parliament (450)
Victor Yushchenko continued when elected President in December 2004 continued to oppose democratic reform in Ukraine and consistently undermined the stability of Ukraine;s Parliament. (Rada)
Following the Ukrainian Parliamentary election election in March 2006. Yushchenko's Party "Our Ukraine" refused to support the formation of an Orange coalition government and the sharing fo power with his coalition partners, Yulia Tymoshenko as Prime minister and Olexandr Moroz. (As speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament.
The stand off lasted three months and Ukraine was facing a constitutional crisis as a result fo Yushchenko's failed leadership. The end results was the collapse of the Orange revolution and the decision of the Socialist party of Ukraine to support the formation of a Unity Government with Victor Yanukovych being elected as Prime Minister. Whilst "Our Ukraine" at first sought to join the newly join government but on the condition that Yushchenko's Party nominated the prime-minister.and various ministerial positions, far in excess of their Parliamentary representation.
In the end Our Ukraine" who was inflicted with division failed to form part of the Unity Government that was made up of Party of Regions, The Communist party or Ukraine and the Socialist Party of Ukraine.
Ukraine's Parliament proposed once again to install a full parliamentary system of governance and remove., a move that was supported by the Parliamentary Assemble of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the European Venice Commission
Victor Yushchenko, who remained opposed to democratic reform, in February 2007 unconstitutionally and illegally dismissed Ukraine's Parliament in order to prevent the Ukraine's Constitution from being amended to remove Presidential authority.
Yushenko going as far as interfering with th3 independence of Ukraine's Constitutional Court illegally dismissed members of the Court in order to prevent the Court form ruling against his decree. Yushchenko's actions caused seven months of political and social inability. proposals to hold fresh Presidential and Parliamentary elections were rejected. The standoff was eventually resolved with an agreement to hold fresh Parliamentary election only.
The results of the fresh parliamentary elections saw the collapse of support for Victror Yushchenko part Our Ukraine. The Socialist Party of Ukraine fell 0.4% short from securing securing only 3.86% of the vote. Had they reached the threshold the overall results of the 2007 Parliamentary would have been the same as the 2006 results.
Yulia Tymoshenko with the support of Our Ukraine managed to secure a majority of one vote in a third ballot of members of the newly elected Parliament and was eventually elected Prime Minister of Ukraine.
The slender margin on the floor of the parliament caused ongoing instability with Victor Yushchenko continuing to undermining the success of Ukraine's parliamentary government
Victor Yushenkso support in Ukraine had collapsed from a high of 54% in 2004 to less than 5% in 2010. Yushcheko was defeated in the first round of the Presidential vote.
Yushchenko then decided to support Victor Yanukovych against Julia Tymshenko in the final round of Presidential voting. Yanukovch was elected with 52% support
Soon after taking office Yanukovch who had previously supported Ukraine's transition to a Parliamentary democracy acted to reversed the Constitutional reforms that were agreed to in 2004 and consolidated power in the office of the President
In 2014 Yanukovych was ousted from office in an unconstitutional violent political coup and the Constitutional reforms of 2004 reinstated. Yanukocych was forced into exile and fresh elections held under controversial circumstances electing Ukraine's current President Petro Poroshenko.
In period following the violent coup in Kyiv, the residents of Crimea voted overwhelmingly to seceded from Ukraine and rejoin the Russian Federation.
Odessa fell victim to atrocities inflicted by the Ultra Right Nationals and
Eastern Ukraine came under attack by nationalist guards in what was considered by many to be political reprisals, verging in civil War, designed to prevent Eastern Ukraine from participating in the early Presidential elections on May 25 2014.
On June 27, 2014 the new president, Petro Poroshenko, signed an association agreement with the European Union amidst a 7 day cease fire in hostilities aimed at Eastern Ukraine. The President has promised constitutional reform which is still to be determined..
Friday, June 27, 2014
CNN's Christiane Amanpour left so much out from the interview with Poroshenko and let him off the hook on may issues as he tried to deflect attention or accept responsibility for Ukraine's Crisis.
The Ukrainian Crisis can not be won by a military solution. The riots in Kyiv were the flash point that set off a serious of events in Ukraine. It undermined rule of law causing a loss of confidence. Radical Right sector forces have been allowed to act with impunity, The atrocities in Odessa and Mariupol must not be forgotten and those responsible MUST be held to account for their crimes against Humanity.
the black shirt unformed militia MUST be disbanded. The State can not just gave them Uniforms and sanctions the killing and slaughter of citizens
There still remain serious issues of legality of the Presidency. Ukraine now has two Presidents. One elected constitutionally and Poroshenko who was elected unconstitutionally. Yanukovych still have not resigned or been impeached. Can you just suspend the constitution and claim that the process was legitimate?
There were 35.5 Million voters e entitled to vote n Ukraine. the turnout on May 25 was 19Mil or 51%. Poroshoenko received 9.7Mil votes (27%) Including Crimea,Lugansk and Donetsk. Crimea represents 2%.
It is rightly argued that the pogrom and attacks on Eastern Ukraine were designed to prevent Eastern Ukraine from voting. Had they fully participated in the election then Poroshenko would have had to face a runoff ballot. He would not have secured an absolute majority of those who would voted. That not to say he would not have won a run off ballot had one been held under more favorable conditions.
Crimea has never seen itself as a part of Ukraine. It was never given the right to chose. Even under Ukraine's governance it remained an Autonomous Republic. The people of Crimea saw what happened in Kyiv and acted swiftly to succeed from Ukraine. I have no doubt that the referendum held in Crimea was a reflection of the people of Crimea. those that claim otherwise are lying or do not know Crimea.
Ukraine has lost Crimea. Given the events that unfolded since February 20 riots in Kyiv and the massacre in Odessa and Eastern Ukraine the concerns of the Crimean people have been proved correct and well founded. They will not return. It would require another referendum to bring about unification and Crimeans will not agree to this. So Poroshenko should kiss Crimea good bye and work on the realities that he now faces,
if Poroshenko is sincere about a unified Ukraine he must fulfill promises on regional autonomy, Language rights and maintain a close working relationship with Russia, Ukraine MUST reject any suggestion of ever joining NATO. In fact Ukraine's nutralit6y should be stated clearly in Ukraine's Constitution.
In addition t issues of Neutrality and NON NATO membership Ukraine need to address issues of Governance and reform of the judicial system. It must restore the functioning of Ukraine's Constitutional Court and ensure its independence
It MUST also stop looking to the US for guidance and models of government. Instead it should look to Europe
It must abandon the Presidential system and adopt a full parliamentary model as recommended by PACE and the Venice Commission back in 2007. the head of state should be elected by a Constitutional Majority for Ukraine's representative Parliament as is the case in Estonia. Latvia, Hungary and a host of other European Republics.
Poroshenko must place the interest of Ukraine ahead of his own personal ambitions.
if he fails to address these issues he will be another failed President like Yushchenko who has 54% support support and by the end of his term of office had dropped to below 5%/
To date he is not showing signs of heading in the right direction. But it is still early days
His biggest and most challenging task in the immediate future is to disband and remove the Right Sector Including Yarosh from positions of authority and control.
Friday, June 20, 2014
We have updated our Ukraine election map to include the the 2014 Presidential election and the 2012 National parliamentary election results. New features added to the map include a National (Default), Regional and Candidate percentage.
Labels: Election results
Monday, February 24, 2014
Ukraine needs to hit the Ctl-Alt_Delete button
✓Cancel Presidential Election
✓Remove power authority from President
✓Have Parliament elect head of state by 2/3 majority vote
✓Engage E Ukraine
✓Reinstate Language rights
✓Say No to NATO
✓Unite not divide the nation
✓Implement Constitutional & Parliamentary reform
✓Hold Fresh Parliamentary elections following
RESET AND RESTART
We apologize for not updating this blog of late.
As you know there is a lot going on in Ukraine of late. Much of which is not Constitutional.
As long as the new regime has the support of the Peoples democratically elected Parliament it can claim some form of authority, We strongly advocate a Parliamentary system and the removal of power from the office of the President
It is hard to support Yanukovych giving a number of reason not the least his concolidation of power and auathority since being elected President and the jailing of Tymocheno
That is not to say we can support the actions of the junta of those engaged in the violent other throw of am elected Government.
Peaceful protestors do not carry guns, Molotov Cocktails and other weapons.
The loss of life is appalling and can only be condemned. Both sides are at fault.
We are also concerned at some of the proposed dictates coming from the Right Sector, These are extremist right wing fascist and their policies can not be tolerated. It appears that they with the suport of the United States are calling the Shots
If you have not yet listen to the tapes google You Tube Nuland Ukraine
In the meantime you can catch us on facebook
Also check out http://foreignnotes.blogspot.com for independent reviews on Ukrainian politics
Sunday, March 03, 2013
After five years of intense negotiations, Ukraine and the European Union are on the verge of taking their relations to a new level.
In March 2012, Kiev and the EU initialed an elaborate association agreement providing for close political cooperation, as well as a deep and comprehensive free-trade area. Now, Kiev is merely a small step away from the treaty’s signing, which is scheduled to take place at the November 2013 Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius. The agreement would, if confirmed, be the largest international pact that Ukraine has ever concluded. This exceptionally large accord—its 906-page main text is now freely available on the websites of the Kiev Post and Kiev Weekly—would also be the biggest contract that the EU has ever entered into with a nonmember state.
Should it be signed, ratified and implemented, the agreement would largely integrate Ukraine into the EU market, as well as politically bind Kiev to Brussels. It is more than an ordinary treaty: The Association Agreement constitutes a detailed plan for a deep restructuring—or “Europeanization”—of the Ukrainian economy, society and state. Once fully realized, it would put Ukraine’s relations to the EU on an entirely different footing.
Moreover, the new reality the agreement would eventually create will make it difficult, if not impossible, for Brussels to continue withholding an explicit EU membership prospect for Ukraine. Today, the Union is purposefully avoiding discussions of a possible future entry of Ukraine, and keeps repeating that, for European countries like Ukraine, “the door is neither open nor closed.”
Yet Brussels will hardly be able to carry on with this vague stance once major provisions of the agreement have been fulfilled. At that stage, Ukraine’s economy will be already part and parcel of the EU economy, and her legislation partially adapted to EU standards. Once all aspects of the new association take full force, it will become illegitimate for Brussels, to further postpone the start of accession negotiations. Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union states that “any European state which respects the principles [of the EU] may apply to become a member of the Union.” In the moment in which Ukraine demonstrates such respect, Kiev can and, presumably, will apply. As a result, eventually, Europe’s largest country may become a full member of the European community.
The Association Agreement is thus the best chance that the Ukrainians ever had to become a nation fully taking part in the European unification process. Apart from far-reaching political, geopolitical and socioeconomic implications, the Agreement has a historical dimension. Once ratified, it will become Ukraine’s primary means of settling her international position, defining her identity as a European nation, and thus determining her future. To be sure, the gradual execution of the agreement will by itself not be a panacea for all of Ukraine’s many problems. But once signed, the Agreement would provide a yardstick for Ukraine’s reforms, an agenda for immediate action, as well as a compass for her development. It could provide the Ukrainian nation with what it may need most today—a clear direction, a sense of purpose, and an attractive future.
Yet while Kiev is today only a stride away from starting this process, the agreement may never be signed. As is well-known to Eastern Europe watchers, Ukraine’s political development took a U-turn three years ago. Since his inauguration in February 2010, Ukraine’s current president, Viktor Yanukovich, has led his country back into to grey zone of domestic semiauthoritarianism and international nonalignment. To be sure, before Yanukovich’s assumption of power in 2010, Ukraine’s post-Soviet development had been proceeding with many zigzags. However, the recent regressions in both domestic and foreign policies go beyond the meanderings of Ukraine’s previous presidents, and constitute a full-scale abolition of many of the democratic gains made since the country gained independence in 1991 and renewed its democratic commitment during the Orange Revolution of 2004. As a result, Brussels had to put the signing of the already initialed Association Agreement on hold. That happened in spite of the fact that there is, across many political camps and countries of the EU, substantial interest in getting the agreement concluded, as it would stabilize its eastern border.
Alas, the Union has had, in order not to lose its face as a community of democratic states, to put forward a number of conditions to be fulfilled by Ukraine before conclusion of the agreement. These include, above all, certain changes in Ukraine’s legal system (e.g. electoral and procurement legislation) as well as a stop of the misuse of courts for persecuting political-opposition leaders. For months now, dozens of representatives of the EU and its member countries have been appealing, on a weekly basis, to Yanukovich and his government to observe at least some elementary rules of law and basic democratic standards in order to make Brussels’ signature on the agreement legitimate.
Not much has improved, however, since it has become clear that the postponement of the agreement’s conclusion no longer has anything to do with technical issues. By late 2012, it became obvious to all observers that the deferment of Brussels’ signature is based on differing assessments of the new political and legal order created by Yanukovich. Until his assumption of power in 2010, Ukraine could have been classified as a defective democracy, as a fundamentally pluralistic order with some substantial flaws. This incomplete, yet already emboldening state of Ukraine’s young democracy was the background against which, in 2007, negotiations of a new fundamental treaty between Brussels and Kiev started. Moreover, in 2008, the title of “Association Agreement” was designed to replace the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Now, however, Ukraine is no longer merely defective, but rather semi- or even pseudodemocratic. In other words, it has a partially authoritarian regime. While the EU may, in certain instances, engage in partnership relations with half-autocracies, it cannot enter a close association and sign the largest external accord in its entire history with a country that does not follow even basic democratic norms.
Kiev’s reaction to the EU’s hardening stance has been paradoxical. Instead of listening to the voices from Brussels as well as many other European capitals and responding by changing its political and legal order, it has become more and more prone to self-deception and escapism. Rather than engaging in a constructive dialogue with the EU about what needs to be done to overcome the deadlock, some high officials in Kiev feed the illusion that Ukrainians can join the European project without getting their country’s fundamentals right. Sweet talk, topic shifting and self-praise is becoming increasingly popular among Ukrainian officials.
Some people in Kiev hope that they can get a signature by playing up differences among European politicians on the relevance of the treaty and the necessity of getting it signed soon. But the decision to sign the Association Agreement will still have to be taken through consensus of all twenty-seven member countries. Some countries—for instance, those who have a security interest in Ukraine’s affiliation with the EU—may indeed decide that a signature is imperative now, no matter what the domestic situation in Ukraine is. But others will be worried about the reputation of the EU as a community of law-based states, and the credibility of Brussels’ worldwide democracy promotion. Signing the agreement with the kind of country Ukraine is today would subvert the EU’s normative foundation as a commonwealth of democratic states, and its attempts to spread postwar European values, in other parts of the world.
Against this background, Ukrainian society will have to make an extra effort not to miss this window of opportunity, which will close in November 2013. It is unclear whether the chance to sign a similar agreement will ever emerge again.
The Ukrainian people should get their current government out of its self-made bubble. The authorities should not be left to distract themselves with public relations campaigns, political technology, or diplomatic trickery. Instead, Ukraine’s civil, economic, intellectual and political sectors should make sure that concrete and substantive changes in Ukraine’s domestic politics and national legislation are implemented within the next few months. Unless the European public gets the impression that things are changing for the better in Ukraine, the EU will not be able to sign the agreement—even if its leaders wanted to. The EU’s decision makers are first and foremost domestic politicians. With as bad an image as Ukraine’s political system has today, they will not be able to justify a close association before their national voters.
The freeing of Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister controversially convicted for transgression of competencies, will have to be part of Ukraine’s image-improvement campaign. One could even argue that for reasons of state this should happen whether Tymoshenko is guilty or not. Her imprisonment is a risky endeavor and political poker game, as it further polarizes an already divided country and sets a dangerous precedent of political losers ending up in prison. Tymoshenko’s incarceration has, for many Europeans, become the major symbol of Ukraine’s clinging to the Soviet past. To the average European, putting a country’s major opposition leader—especially a female one—behind bars is by itself unacceptable. It looks even more dubious when seen in combination with various other regressions of Yanukovich’s regime, like the change of constitution or formation of a turncoats’ coalition, both in the newly elected President’s favor, in 2010. Some Western observers, to be sure, have claimed that Tymoshenko’s behavior may not have always been impeccable. Yet, even among these critics, there would be hardly any who doubt that the opposition leader’s arrest, trial and imprisonment are manifestations of Ukraine’s authoritarianism rather than rule of law.
The simultaneous imprisonment of another opposition leader, Yurii Lutsenko, Ukraine’s former interior minister, has been raising even more eyebrows among Western Ukraine watchers than the arrest of the former prime minister. In Tymoshenko’s case, at least, the court’s accusations had been grave—although they were not dealt with, as the EU argues, in a properly law-based court trial. In the case of Lutsenko, however, his sentence always appeared as grossly disproportionate to his supposed misdoings—even if they had all been true. The Ukrainian leadership has become a victim of its own propaganda: in its suppression of political opposition it has lost sight of any proportion, and talked itself into an alternate reality of EU-Ukraine relations.
While Ukraine has a unique chance with the scheduled signing of the agreement this year, it simultaneously faces enormous risks until the next presidential elections in 2015. Whether economic growth, financial stability, interethnic relations, energy security, social cohesion or relations with Russia, Ukraine will be confronted with daring challenges that may bring the country to the verge of collapse. For the nascent Ukrainian state to hold together in stormy times, a signed EU Association Agreement could provide a rallying point and glimpse of hope.
Ukraine’s European integration is, to one degree or another, supported by all major Ukrainian political forces, large swaths of the population and almost the entire intellectual elite. It would be sad—and, in a worst-case scenario, catastrophic—if the Ukrainians miss this opportunity to finally determine their destiny.
Dr. Andreas Umland is DAAD Associate Professor of Political Science at the National University of “Kiev-Mohyla Academy,” a member of the Valdai Discussion Club, and editor of the book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society”.
Image: Wikimedia Commons/Fry1989. CC BY-SA 3.0.
Saturday, May 26, 2012
Ukraine should stand by the principles of the rule of law and democracy if it wants to join the EU at some point, MEPs said in a debate on the treatment of former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko. However, views differed on whether it was a good idea for leading EU politicians to boycott the Euro 2012 football games in Ukraine over this. The parliamentary debate was also attended by Ms Tymoshenko's daughter, Yevgenia.
In October 2011, Ms Tymoshenko was sentenced to seven years in jail on charges of abuse of power in connection with the conclusion of gas contracts with the Russian Federation. During the debate on Tuesday 22 May, MEPs highlighted the concerns they had over the case:
Tymoshenko's case does not stand alone and a comprehensive judicial reform is needed in Ukraine
selective and politically motivated justice is unacceptable
the respect of democracy and rule of law is indispensible if the country wants to become a member of the EU eventually
parliamentary elections this year will be a test of progress
opposition candidates should be given an even playing field
Monday, January 30, 2012
Which two Ukrainians most detest Yulia Tymoshenko, most fear her, and most obsess about her?
Source: World Affairs
It’s the two Viktors, of course: Yushchenko and Yanukovych.
Most Ukrainians have very strong opinions about the former prime minister turned political prisoner, but it’s only the two Viktors who’ve let their feelings about her become borderline psychotic.
In the last three years of his presidency, 2006 to 2009, Yushchenko abandoned whatever reform aspirations that may have guided him during the Orange Revolution and concentrated almost exclusively on squabbling with and attacking Tymoshenko, never passing up an opportunity to denounce her, regardless of whether his audience was listening or cared. I personally witnessed him bore two roomfuls in New York with hour-long attacks on Tymoshenko: the first group consisting of some 50 potential American investors who wanted to hear about Ukraine’s economy; the second, of some 100 Ukrainian-Americans who wanted to hear about Ukraine’s culture.
Just as Yushchenko let his obsession with Tymoshenko define, and ultimately destroy, his presidency, so too has Yanukovych. After she lost the presidential election of 2010, Tymoshenko was washed up as a national politician. All Yanukovych had to do to keep her that way was to ignore her. Instead, by persecuting Tymoshenko, by jailing her at precisely the time that he’s ostensibly courting Europe and hoping to negotiate a gas deal with Russia, he’s given her the ethical stature she never had, undermined his standing at home and abroad, sabotaged Ukraine’s attempts to integrate more closely with the European Union, and provided the Kremlin with additional reasons for stonewalling Kyiv. Like that other Viktor, this one has let his obsession with Tymoshenko define, and ultimately destroy, his presidency.
So what gives? Although Yanukovych has moved toward many of Yushchenko’s positions in the last year, the fact is that the two are profoundly different presidents. Yushchenko was, despite his multitudinous faults, significantly more pro-democratic, pro-Ukrainian, and pro-market than the unabashedly anti-democratic, anti-Ukrainian, and anti-market Yanukovych. They are also very different politicians, with Yushchenko preferring the safety of a podium and Yanuovych preferring the safety of a designer suit.
Why would two such different policymakers share the same fear and loathing of Tymoshenko?
I suspect it’s because they’re the same kind of guys. It’s not Tymoshenko the politician they hate, but Tymoshenko the too-strong woman who knows they’re both pushovers and treats them as such. After all, Yushchenko knows how to deal with male enemies. He bores them to death or, as in the case of Yanukovych, cuts a deal with them.
Yanukovych’s approach is even simpler, and usually involves a sock to the jaw. Neither approach works with Tymoshenko. She can run rhetorical circles around Yushchenko and knock Yanukovych off his leaden feet.
Tymoshenko, as the strong woman of Ukrainian politics, has exposed both fellas for the vain weaklings they really are. When Yushchenko lost his charms after being poisoned and disfigured in the summer of 2004, Tymoshenko not only threatened his authority and standing as president. She also threatened his manhood and his sense of self as a ladies’ man. Moreover, she didn’t fall for his act precisely because she wanted what he only half-wanted: power. And she never failed to pursue it, for better or for worse, while Yushchenko never failed to let it slip out of his fingers.
Yanukovych is an even more transparently self-doubting male who is also burdened with the sense of inadequacy that comes from being a hoodlum-turned-honcho. Hence the big mouth and big talk and big fists. Hence the absence of women in his prime minister’s cabinet. When wife Ludmilla went off the deep end during the Orange Revolution, Yanukovych could respond only by banishing her to Donetsk. When political opponent Yulia claimed that he was a thug and a crook during the 2010 presidential campaign, he could respond only by banishing her to a jail. Small wonder that his leading female cheerleader, Hanna Herman, gets big bucks for her efforts.
Self-confident politicians and self-confident men would have treated Tymoshenko as just what she was—a strong-willed, tough, and ruthless politician—regardless of her sex. But neither Yushchenko nor Yanukovych can, evidently, see past that. And that obviously drives both fellas crazy, to the point of preferring political suicide to rational policymaking.
Tymoshenko’s inevitable comeback will be a traumatic defeat for both Viktors. When the queen bee returns, expect both of them to take up bee-keeping full-time.
Saturday, January 21, 2012
Deputy Prosecutor: Yushchenko's poisoning was invented by his staff
MP David Zhvania told us that the scandal around poisoning former president Viktor Yushchenko in 2004 was an idea of Yushchenko's election campaign staff, Deputy Prosecutor General Renat Kuzmin said in an interview with NBN.
"Zhvania testified that nobody poisoned Yushchenko, that there was no poisoning at all and that this entire story was invented by Yushchenko's election campaign staff in order to win the election accusing then authorities of poisoning," Kuzmin said.
"Zhvania also said that he was against this idea. He says, he tried to explain that this lie would be eventual revealed that it was too cynical to lie to the whole world. After that he was excluded from the staff," the official added.
According to the Deputy prosecutor General, many witnesses state that Yushchenko was poisoned and believe in this, while the others assure it was a fraud. "That's why we asked Yushchenko to take a blood test again," Kuzmin said.
On September 5, 2004 Viktor Yushchenko, then candidate for presidency, met with Security Service authorities, after which he felt bad. On September 10 he was hospitalized to Vienna clinic for examination, which revealed that Yushchenko was poisoned by dioxin. Repeated examination in May 2006 confirmed the presence of dioxin in Yushchenko's organism.
In November 2009 the temporary investigative commission of the parliament declared the necessity to change the composition of the investigation group of prosecution and to hold new tests in order to prove the version of poisoning.
After his appointment on the post of Prosecutor General (November 2010) Viktor Pshonka repeatedly confirmed his intention to take additional test of Yushchenko's blood in Ukrainian lab, but Viktor Yushchenko refused. The former President declared he would agree to take a blood test in the national lab only if the Prosecution had solid reasons.
Labels: Victor Yushchenko
Monday, January 16, 2012
Now available on its own web site with full text search and commentary options.
A must read for anyone following Ukrainian modern political history.
(data extracted from the Wikileaks US Cables archive)
Other regional WiKileaks US Cables
Friday, January 13, 2012
In addition they have clearly demonstrated to the world at large that they are not going to take any notice of internationally recognised legal due process or the rule of law and that has now set the tone not only for this Presidency but also for the nation as a whole.
The problem is that his administration would appear to neither care nor even notice as they continue to feed the President bad advice and irresponsible decision making.
The crazy part about the whole venture is that it was simply not necessary. He won the election, he was ahead in all the polls and Tymoshenko as leader of the opposition was floundering like a beached whale.
All they needed to do was to maintain a level head and she would have destroyed herself without the President having to lift a finger. Now she is Europe’s most famous political prisoner, an accolade she hardly warrants.
It was only natural that the President might want to exact some sort of revenge after his humiliation after the Orange revolution but wiser heads should have prevailed. Somebody should have whispered in his ear that the only person who suffers as a result of such malice is the bearer. Instead they have consigned him to one of the darker periods of Ukrainian history.
Tuesday, January 10, 2012
Foreignnotes has another good appraisal of what waits Ukraine in the new year. 2012 does not offer high hopes for any change in fortune. Even the Euro2012 games will not lift the vale of despair.
'It is clear that post-Soviet system of governance and social division has exhausted itself - and not only in Ukraine" says -TV journalist Vitaliy Portnikov
Fellow journalist, Mustafa Nayem, considers any change is not possible at the the moment. "Those who could potentially take over power are not capable of explaining why those currently in power are worse than they are.'
Whilst hopeful Mykola Knyazytskyi, considers a change is possible."If the country's basic democratic principles are neglected and there are no resources to fulfill the social needs of its citizens, mass protests may start any minute, and no one can predict when they could start." The [revised] Ukrainian political system was formed by Viktor Yanukovych himself, so he has taken full responsibility for what happens in the country onto himself. Sociological reports indicate that neither he nor his party command a majority of the electorate. "Quite simply he is not liked as a leader. Dictators can retain power either by bayonets, or by the love of the people...And if there is no love, then Facebook and Twitter - are much more powerful weapons than bayonets"
The opposition are divided and lack direction, leadership and a vision of change.
Even if dissatisfaction in the current presidential ruler-ship takes hold and the opposition manage to win a majority of seats in the new Parliament (Unlikely given the rules of the election are already stacked against them) they will still lack authority and power to implement change.
Ukraine will never be a free independent democratic state as long as Ukraine remains dominated and beholden to Presidential rule. In the absence of a united polices and ground swell of public opinion calling for change in the system not just the faces Ukraine will continue suffer its fate unknown. Things are going to get a lot worst for Ukraine before they get better.
Democracy and responsible representative government is that much further and harder to reach as long as the opposition remain divided without vision or a road map for change.
Saturday, January 07, 2012
The vibrant discussion became so hot that it gave cause for KyivPost to censor the debate and remove all comments, even though the comments were relatively tame and in order. There was no justification or merit in having these comments removed.
It is unclear if Kyivpost's decision was taken following representations by the author Leigh Turner or by the Editorial staff acting under direction of third parties.
This is not the first time Kyivpost has acted in such a censorial role denying public debate and discussion on political topics. It is certainly not the first time Kyivpost have removed comments on Mr Tuner's Op-ed.
It does raise the question 'how free is Ukraine's media?' And should a media outlet that espouses western democratic values and campaigns for the rights of 'Free Speech' and a Media rights unilaterally, without explanation, remove public comments and discussion on such a important issue.
The withdrawal of public comments has brought KyivPost and UK's Ambassador into disrepute. KyivPost owes its readership an explanation and justification for its actions, if only to prove that it is a pro democratic free speech media outlet.
Wednesday, January 04, 2012
Recent reviews and public opinion polls have Tymoshenko leading over Yanukovych in the primary vote.
This comes as no surprise. Yanukovych can thank his mate Yushchenko for this monumental strategic stuff-up. Yushchenko and the government administration helped turn Tymoshenko into a Martyr.
Yanukovych's term of office has virtually finished, as he has been overshadowed by the events surrounding Tymoshenko's imprisonment. He has no one else to blame for his own demise other then himself and those who he has taken advice from. No one is listening to any positive statements he has to make and he is one step short of being totally isolated from any meaningful negotiations with the west. I sincerely doubt if he can recover from this diplomatic disaster that has been imposed on Ukraine.
Tymoshenko's support was on the decline prior to her arrest, as was pointed out by Taras Chornovil in a recent interview published in the Day. She has become more powerful and influential whist locked up.
As Ukraine begins to feels the economic fall out and the impact of Tymoshenko's arrest begins to undermine the success of the Euro2012 games, pressure will begin to build for Yanukovych to stand down so as to avoid further economic isolation and decline.
Much will depend on how Ukraine reacts to the inevitable review by the European Court of Human Rights. Tymoshenko needs to exhaust her appeal rights within Ukraine before the ECHR can review her case.
It is in Ukraine's interest that this matter is brought before the European Court at the earliest opportunity. Further delay will only compound the diplomatic impact of the fall out.
The other still outstanding issue is the secondary charges laid against Tymoshenko. In theory they could be dropped if Tymoshenko's appeal to the ECHR is successful.
Once she is released all hell will break out.
It is still uncertain if she will be imprisoned in the lead-up to the 2012 Parliamentary elections. Any election without Tymoshenko will lack authority or acceptance.
The best option come would be for Yanukovych to initiate Constitutional reform, renounce presidential power in favour of Ukraine adopting a full Parliamentary system of government, and then resign once the new legislation is in place and a new government elected allowing the new parliament to elect a new head of state with reduced authority.
Monday, January 02, 2012
The Tymoshenko factor, political persecution has triggered international outrage which could seriously impact on Ukraine's economic and diplomatic standing is the President's downfall. Already Yanukovych's presidency has been brought into disrepute as he becomes isolated by the international community. How long can his presidency last as Ukraine's economic future is held in the balance? It could even have a negative impact in the Euro2012 games. Already European Integration has been placed on ice. Will sanctions follow?